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LARRY RIBSTEIN’S FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES 
Kelli A. Alces∗ 
 Larry Ribstein, throughout his remarkable scholarly career, devel-
oped a theory formed around his analysis that the end of fiduciary obliga-
tion is a near possibility.  Understanding fiduciary obligations as a careful-
ly defined term may indicate, however, that this fiduciary obligation can be 
a useful part of a wider selection of relationships than Ribstein allowed.  
This Article both considers Ribstein’s theory of fiduciary duty, and ulti-
mately turns that same theory on its head by advocating the use of a nar-
row duty in a variety of contexts as opposed to a broad duty in a limited 
range of circumstances. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of his remarkable scholarly career, Larry Ribstein 
carefully developed a theory of fiduciary duties that explains the ad-
                                                                                                                                      
 ∗  Loula Fuller and Dan Myers Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law.  
This essay is dedicated to the memory of my corporate law teacher, mentor, and friend Larry Ribstein.  
He left us far too soon and is dearly missed.  We are very fortunate to have the rich body of scholar-
ship he left behind to guide us as we continue to try to find answers to important legal questions.  
Though Larry taught me most of what I know about fiduciary duties, he would want me to point out 
that all errors in the analysis here are my own. 
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vantages of his favored uncorporations, the essence of a contractarian 
view of corporate governance, and the role of trust in legal relationships.1   
Conventional wisdom has held that fiduciary relationships are wide-
spread and best understood as broad commands against selfish behavior 
that lead to obligations to act with the utmost good faith and loyalty.  To 
the contrary, Ribstein argued that fiduciary duties are optional contract 
terms that parties can choose to have in relationships where one party 
exercises discretion and control over the assets of the other.2 
Ribstein was not opposed to fiduciary obligation, nor did he think it 
should be removed from corporate law.  Rather, he argued that the fidu-
ciary duty of loyalty, properly understood, was essential to managing the 
agency costs occasioned by the complete delegation of control over cor-
porate assets to a board of directors.3  He believed that parties agreed by 
contract to enter into relationships that implicate fiduciary obligation, 
and so they should be able to modify those duties or opt out of them all 
together, in designing the legal relationship desired by the parties. 
The rise of uncorporations4 as popular alternatives to the corporate 
form is due, in part, to this narrow understanding of fiduciary duties.  
Uncorporations allow owner-members and managers to opt out of fidu-
ciary duties in many instances and to define the terms and limits of the 
fiduciary obligations they may impose on one another.5  Ribstein was 
among the first to challenge the conventional wisdom that partners and 
agents are always fiduciaries.6  Though he advocated a limited role for 
fiduciary duties, he maintained that fiduciary obligation could be useful 
in some instances, but that it could be harmful if invoked too often or in 
too many circumstances.7 
It may be possible to see the end of fiduciary obligation from Rib-
stein’s analysis.  If the duty of loyalty is only appropriate in limited cir-
cumstances and then is only enforced as a narrow obligation to refrain 
from self-dealing, then it may evolve to be a narrow, specific contract 
term.   
                                                                                                                                      
 1. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 1–2 (2010); Larry E.  
Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 212–14 [hereinafter Ribstein, Are Part-
ners Fiduciaries]; Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 900 (2011) [herein-
after Ribstein, Fencing]; Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 540 (1997) [hereinafter Ribstein, Fiduciary Contracts]; Larry E. Ribstein, 
Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 555–56 (2001) [hereinafter Ribstein, Law v. Trust]. 
 2. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries, supra note 1, at 212. 
 3. Ribstein, Fencing, supra note 1, at 919. 
 4. The “uncorporation” is a term Ribstein coined to describe unincorporated business associa-
tions. RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1 (“The term presently includes general and limited partnerships, lim-
ited liability companies (LLCs), and variations on these entities.”).  His seminal work on this topic, the 
culmination of his life’s work in studying business associations, is his book THE RISE OF THE 
UNCORPORATION, published in 2010.  
 5. Id. at 171–79. 
 6. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries, supra note 1, at 251 (“[P]artners or equivalent parties 
have [fiduciary] duties only as agents or as managers of centrally managed firms.”). 
 7. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 1, at 555–56 (arguing that mandatory regulation could de-
crease trust by giving parties a weapon they could use opportunistically). 
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Alternatively, understanding fiduciary obligation as a carefully de-
fined term may reveal that fiduciary duty can be a useful part of a wider 
variety of relationships than Ribstein would have allowed.  We may find 
a broader application for a specific and well-understood obligation.  This 
Article will consider the implications of Ribstein’s theory of fiduciary du-
ty both within and beyond business association law and turn Ribstein’s 
theory on its head, ultimately advocating the use of a narrow duty in a 
variety of contexts rather than a broad duty in limited circumstances. 
Part II explains Ribstein’s theory of fiduciary duty and situates it in 
the legal academic debate on the subject.  Ribstein’s narrow view of fidu-
ciary duties contrasts starkly with other perspectives advocating the use 
of fiduciary duties in a variety of fields to inspire trust and confidence 
among strangers.  His theory convincingly explains the very limited use 
of fiduciary liability in business association law.  Part III explores the ap-
plication of fiduciary duty to business associations, both corporate and 
uncorporate forms alike.  It finds that the duty of loyalty that managers 
owe firms in business association law is not strictly enforced when man-
datory, and is becoming increasingly optional in unincorporated firms.  
Part IV combines the best of both approaches to find a more consistent, 
accurately descriptive theory of fiduciary duty.  It argues that a relatively 
clear understanding of the duty of loyalty can be consistently and pre-
dictably applied in a variety of relationships and need not be the path to 
unrestrained liability that Ribstein feared. 
II. FIDUCIARY DUTY, DEFINED 
Ribstein subscribed to the school of thought holding there is only 
one fiduciary duty: the duty of loyalty.8  The duty of unselfishness is the 
only true fiduciary duty because it is the only duty unique to fiduciary re-
lationships.  Indeed, in Ribstein’s view, one party’s agreement to “re-
nounce” all thought of self defines the relationship as fiduciary.9  Com-
pletely selfless behavior is rarely justified and difficult to enforce.10  Thus, 
Ribstein argues that we should use fiduciary relationships only rarely and 
only in particularly defined situations.11  Because the enforcement of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 8. Noting other scholars with whom he agreed on this point, Ribstein cited Matthew Conaglen, 
The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty, 121 L.Q. Rev. 452, 459–60 (2005); Robert Cooter & 
Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1991); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 74–79 
(discussing categories of fiduciary duties but indicating that each incorporated an obligation of loyal-
ty); J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAW Q. REV. 51, 75 
(1981) (defining a fiduciary relationship as a “duty to utilise that power in the best interests of anoth-
er”); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1406 
(2002) (defining fiduciary duty as a duty of loyalty or unselfishness).  Ribstein, Fencing, supra note 1, 
at 901 n.7.  
 9. Id. at 903 (adopting Judge Cardozo’s famous language in Meinhard v. Salmon describing 
fiduciary obligation in strong terms requiring completely selfless conduct). 
 10. Id. (noting that selfless behavior “undermines the incentives that motivate business people to 
provide high-quality goods and services”). 
 11. See id. 
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fiduciary duty requires ex post review of the fiduciary’s behavior by a 
court, it is important that the fiduciary duty of loyalty be defined in the 
stark terms of complete selflessness because then it can be predictably 
enforced.12  According to Ribstein, selfishness is easier to identify and 
correct than simple negligence or harm to the beneficiary, so the court 
will be able to identify and correct the fiduciary’s lapse in loyalty.13 
Of course, fiduciaries owe other duties to their beneficiaries, but 
those duties are not fiduciary in nature because they are also owed by 
nonfiduciaries; even within fiduciary relationships, they are not central to 
the fiduciary nature of the relationship.  For example, the duty of care is 
not a fiduciary duty in Ribstein’s view because it would be impossible, 
impractical, and probably undesirable for a fiduciary to be unselfish “re-
garding the fiduciary’s commitment of time and attention.”14  Further, 
one who agrees to perform a task on behalf of someone else must also 
agree to perform that task with care.15  An obligation to exercise care is 
not the same as undertaking a fiduciary obligation.  Because one does 
not give rise to the other, and because a party may owe a duty of care 
without having a fiduciary relationship, Ribstein reasons that the duty of 
care is not a fiduciary duty even though it is a duty to which all fiduciar-
ies are bound.16 
Because the fiduciary duty of loyalty requires strict unselfishness, 
which is a lot to ask of a legal relationship between strangers, it is only 
appropriate or desirable in certain limited circumstances.  Ribstein ar-
gues that fiduciary duties are only justified in relationships involving “a 
property owner’s delegation to a manager of open-ended management 
power over property without corresponding economic rights.”17  That is, 
where there is a separation of ownership from control, fiduciary duties 
are necessary to prevent the fiduciary from using the property entrusted 
to it for personal benefit.18  This limited universe of relationships that 
Ribstein views as appropriately fiduciary includes those between corpo-
rate directors and the corporation and between trustees and the benefi-
ciaries of a trust.  It excludes, however, other relationships that have 
been traditionally categorized as fiduciary, such as agency relationships, 
partnerships, attorney/client relationships and doctor/patient relation-
ships. 
In this way, Ribstein’s view contrasts importantly with other domi-
nant theories of fiduciary obligation.  For instance, Frank Easterbrook 
and Dan Fischel have argued that fiduciary duties are justified whenever 
the gaps in a given contract are sufficiently large and monitoring is suffi-
ciently difficult that parties want courts to use principles of fiduciary ob-
                                                                                                                                      
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. at 904. 
 14. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries, supra note 1, at 220. 
 15. Id. at 220–21. 
 16. Id. (explaining that a doctor can owe a patient a duty of care without being a fiduciary). 
 17. Ribstein, Fencing, supra note 1, at 901. 
 18. Id. 
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ligation to fill those gaps when considering what terms the parties would 
have agreed to had they negotiated about the circumstance at issue ex 
ante.19  Tamar Frankel has argued that fiduciary duties are justified in re-
lationships of trust where one party is vulnerable to the other’s judgment 
or expertise.20  These conceptions of fiduciary relationships allow that fi-
duciary obligation may be appropriate to protect vulnerable parties in a 
wide variety of relationships. 
Under the Easterbrook-Fischel approach, contractual relationships 
fall along a continuum between those that are not fiduciary in nature at 
all and those that are completely fiduciary.21  Where a particular relation-
ship falls depends on how large the gaps in the contract are, how much 
about the parties’ behavior is left undetermined by the contractual terms, 
and how difficult it is for one party to monitor the other.22  Then, when 
faced with a potential breach of duty, courts apply the standard of fiduci-
ary obligation to reach a result that approximates what the parties would 
have agreed to had they negotiated about a particular circumstance at 
the outset.  That is, the court assumes the parties would have agreed up-
on a result in which the fiduciary behaved unselfishly in pursuing the best 
interests of the beneficiary.  Using this reasoning, parties could contract 
for a fiduciary relationship whenever they agree that one party should 
selflessly pursue the interests of the other.  They would be free to reach 
this agreement whether or not there is a broad delegation of control over 
the beneficiary’s property. 
Ribstein responded to this approach in part by arguing that other 
methods of constraining agency costs work much better in most of those 
situations and if other mechanisms are more cost effective, they should 
be preferred to fiduciary obligation.23  Ribstein’s argument in favor of 
limiting fiduciary obligation to only the one kind of relationship is signif-
icantly predicated on the idea that fiduciary obligation should be the last 
resort.24  It is difficult, though, to be confident that nonfiduciary mecha-
nisms will always work so well, or that fiduciary obligation will not be 
more effective if both parties agree to its application, particularly if they 
both know what it means and what the consequences of breach are.  If 
fiduciary obligation is supposed to be a freely imposed creature of con-
tract, why could parties not decide it is the cheapest or easiest way to al-
locate rights and responsibilities between them?  Where they have made 
                                                                                                                                      
 19. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 
425, 427 (1993) (“The duty of loyalty replaces detailed contractual terms, and courts flesh out the duty 
of loyalty by prescribing the actions the parties themselves would have preferred if bargaining were 
cheap and all promises fully enforced.”). 
 20. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 809‒10 (1983). 
 21. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 19, at 438. 
 22. Id. (“When transaction costs reach a particularly high level, some persons start calling some 
contractual relations ʽfiduciaryʼ . . . .”). 
 23. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries, supra note 1, at 233. 
 24. See id. at 232–37 (arguing that fiduciary duties may weaken alternative constraints by un-
dermining voluntary cooperation or deterring nonmanaging owners from exercising governance 
rights). 
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that choice, does that not indicate that the parties have decided that it is 
the best course of action or contract term for them? 
Indeed, some scholars note the usefulness of fiduciary obligation in 
instances where one party is necessarily vulnerable to the other’s judg-
ment or performance of a task.25  In these situations, which likely fall at 
the fiduciary end of Easterbrook and Fischel’s continuum, the parties 
might feel that selflessness is necessary and that the vulnerable party’s 
inability to monitor makes other forms of constraining agency costs im-
practical.  This “entrustment” theory of fiduciary obligation, most nota-
bly developed by Tamar Frankel,26 aims to encourage parties to engage in 
transactions from which they might otherwise abstain because the trans-
action or relationship makes them too vulnerable to the counterparty’s 
ability to take advantage.  For instance, a patient may not be willing to 
entrust her health to a surgeon’s skill without some assurance that the 
doctor is bound to eschew self-interest and work solely for the patient’s 
benefit in performing the surgery.27  Fiduciary duties, Frankel argues, ex-
ist to encourage the trust that is necessary to enter into a variety of rela-
tionships and transactions.  It is hard not to leave with the impression 
that this view sees fiduciary obligation as a command to the fiduciary to 
“be nice” or “be honest and loyal” in a more common, social sense.  
Some call this social aspect of loyalty “being true.”28  Fiduciary obligation 
exists to give entrustors peace of mind that their fiduciaries have their 
best interests at heart. 
Ribstein argued, to the contrary, that trust and kindness are extra-
legal.  That is, if you have to legally enforce an obligation to be trustwor-
thy, you do not trust.  If you have to legally enforce kindness, it is not 
kindness.  Regulation and legal rules undermine rather than promote 
trust, because trust is defined by faith in the face of vulnerability.29  And 
legal rules cannot give you faith you do not have.  They only provide pro-
tection from some of the costs of disappointment.  When the law inter-
venes to protect a vulnerable party from another’s abuse of power, the 
vulnerable party is not trusting. 30  The vulnerable party does not have to 
trust because the law protects that party.31  Ribstein argued that parties 
would not enter into relationships that presented too great a risk of vul-
nerability without legal protection.  They therefore were not trusting.  
                                                                                                                                      
 25. Frankel, supra note 20, at 816 (“Because the entrustor cannot satisfactorily protect himself 
while maintaining the benefits of the fiduciary relation, the law must intervene to protect him from 
abuse of power by rules that are sensitive to the dangers that the relations pose for the entrustor.”). 
 26. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1289, 1291–92 
(2011) [hereinafter Frankel, Twenty-First Century]. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 
74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1215–19 (1995) [hereinafter Frankel, Default Rules]; Frankel, supra note 20, at 
832–36. 
 27. See Frankel, Twenty-First Century, supra note 26, at 1293. 
 28. See Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
457, 489 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 1, at 555–56 (explaining that regulations can cause distrust 
because parties can use them opportunistically). 
 30. Id. at 558‒59, 571. 
 31. Id. at 571. 
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Trust, Ribstein maintained, is for personal relationships and the “law 
substitutes for rather than complements trust.”32 
Ribstein’s view of trust and fiduciary obligation differed widely 
from his peers.  While other scholars saw fiduciary obligation as a way to 
promote trust and allow for greater protection in relationships defined by 
vulnerability,33 Ribstein counted on parties to protect themselves ex ante 
and only to rely on the ex post judicial review occasioned by fiduciary law 
when nothing else would suffice. 34 
There is, however, a middle ground.  Ribstein argued that the duty 
of loyalty, when properly employed, would mean complete selflessness in 
limited circumstances.  When we look, in Part III at how fiduciary duties 
are enforced in the limited circumstances Ribstein identified, we find a 
duty that requires much less than complete selflessness.  On the other 
hand, many scholars argue that fiduciary duties should lead to complete 
selflessness by fiduciaries in a variety of situations.  This Article advo-
cates a view of fiduciary duty that adopts the narrow application we see 
in business associations and allows that narrowly defined duty to be used 
in a variety of situations marked by the relative vulnerability of one par-
ty.  The problem Ribstein correctly identified with more expansive un-
derstandings of fiduciary obligation is that they can be indeterminate and 
costly to enforce.  When we look at how most relationships that are con-
sidered “fiduciary” are actually managed, however, we see that the obli-
gations of the fiduciaries are actually quite carefully defined.  We may 
acknowledge that fiduciary duties are supposed to be applied flexibly ex 
post to determine if unanticipated behavior violates the duty, but we also 
find great utility in defining as many of the terms of the relationship as 
possible ex ante. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, Ribstein’s narrow view of fiduciary 
obligation could spell the end of fiduciary relationships entirely as there 
are almost always other mechanisms available for closing gaps.  That re-
alization, combined with the high costs of enforcing fiduciary duties 
against corporate managers, has led to a decline in the strength and sig-
nificance of fiduciary duties in business association law.  Ribstein, in par-
ticular, tracked this decline through the rise of LLCs that do not require 
fiduciary duties to obligate managers to the firm’s owners.  Part III of 
this Article considers the decline of fiduciary duties in business associa-
tions.  Then, Part IV suggests some ideas about what that decline might 
mean for future work on the theory supporting the use of fiduciary rela-
                                                                                                                                      
 32. Id. at 556. 
 33. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 879, 902; Frankel, Default Rules, supra note 26, at 1215–19.  
 34. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, supra note 1, at 213 (“Applying fiduciary duties broadly 
threatens to undermine partiesʼ contracts by imposing obligations the parties do not want or expect.”); 
Ribstein, Fiduciary Contracts, supra note 1, at 541 (characterizing fiduciary duties as a hypothetical 
bargain); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 19, at 427 (explaining that fiduciary duties replace 
contract terms that parties could not practically bargain over ex ante).     
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tionships generally, and how continuing to use fiduciary law could be 
most helpful. 
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
Fiduciary obligation is one method of limiting the agency costs in-
herent in the separation of ownership from control in the modern corpo-
ration.  The corporation presents one of the paradigmatic cases for fidu-
ciary obligation under Ribstein’s theory.35 
There, owners (the shareholders) delegate authority over their 
property (corporate assets) to managers who are bound to act selflessly 
in managing that property for the benefit of the owners.  Of course, much 
in corporate law scholarly literature has challenged various parts of this 
conventional agency understanding of the allocation of ownership and 
control in the corporation, but the traditional description of the relation-
ships used by Ribstein’s analysis suits our purposes.  Under the agency 
view, corporate officers and directors must not engage in transactions in 
which their personal interests are in conflict with the profit-maximizing 
interests of the corporation.  They must only pursue corporate interests 
in deciding how to operate the firm.  If directors or officers violate this 
duty of loyalty, the corporation can sue them, or the shareholders can sue 
on the corporation’s behalf.  Here, it is the delegation of open-ended 
control over assets belonging to another that justifies the use of the duty 
of loyalty to prevent managers from distributing the property under their 
control to themselves. 36 
A. Corporations 
Ribstein argued that corporations are one paradigmatic case for the 
application of fiduciary obligation.  In corporations there is a “property 
owner’s delegation to a manager of open-ended management power over 
property without corresponding economic rights.”37  The separation of 
ownership from control in corporate governance seems to lend itself to 
adoption of a duty of loyalty under Ribstein’s theory. 
1. The Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty prohibits corporate officers and directors from 
engaging in transactions or pursuing courses of action in which their per-
sonal financial interest conflicts with that of the corporation.  If a manag-
er wants to pursue such a transaction, she must receive the approval of 
the disinterested members of the board, a majority of disinterested 
shareholders, or be able to demonstrate that the transaction in question 
                                                                                                                                      
 35. Ribstein, Fencing, supra note 1, at 901. 
 36. Id. at 904. 
 37. Id. at 901. 
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is inherently fair to the corporation. 38  This generally means that directors 
cannot deal with the corporation themselves without disclosing their role 
in the transaction to the rest of the board and receiving the requisite ap-
proval of the deal.  It also means that directors may not, for instance, fa-
vor close relatives in granting contracts with the firm to others.  The doc-
trine of corporate opportunity, which prevents a director or officer from 
taking a business opportunity in the corporation’s line of business that 
the corporation has the ability to pursue, is another application of the du-
ty of loyalty.39  In taking the opportunity, the fiduciary would be taking 
for herself potential profit that she should be seeking for the corporation.  
In order to pursue the opportunity individually, the officer or director 
must obtain permission from the board.40 
Within these standard examples of liability for breach of the duty of 
loyalty, the duty boils down to a narrow, straightforward contract term, 
simply, “[D]on’t be . . . conflicted without permission.”41  We simply ask 
some parties not to pursue self-interest ahead of the interests of another 
while performing a particular task.  No fiduciary is asked to eschew self-
interest in all areas of life or even business, only in those that would di-
rectly conflict with the task for which he has agreed to act as fiduciary.  
Within that narrow scope exact conflicts may be hard to anticipate, but 
they are not hard to identify. 
In recent years, the Delaware Supreme Court has used dicta in fidu-
ciary duty cases to try to expand the common understanding of the scope 
and nature of the corporate duty of loyalty.42  In Stone v. Ritter, the court 
explained that actions taken in bad faith, such as an intentional failure to 
perform a known duty, would constitute breaches of the duty of loyalty, 
even though the bad behavior described would traditionally be under-
stood to fall within the duty of care.43  Andrew Gold has expressed con-
cern that this expansive rhetoric, if enforced, may allow directors to be 
held liable for breaching the duty of care even when they believe the ac-
tion they are taking is in the best interests of the corporation.44 
Fortunately, the Delaware Supreme Court took away with one hand 
what it gave with the other.  Very shortly after Stone v. Ritter, the court 
made clear in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan45 that liability for actions 
taken in bad faith would be rare, as bad faith is a difficult standard for 
plaintiffs to meet.  This is not to say that the court’s rhetoric has no force.  
                                                                                                                                      
 38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (West 2010).  The disinterested requirement has been read 
in by courts. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976). 
 39. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 40. See id. at 513 (holding an officer violated his duty of loyalty and finding he did not present an 
opportunity to his corporation's board before taking it for himself).   
 41. Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 269 (2009) 
[hereinafter Alces, Debunking] (defining a conflict of interest as a financial conflict, not an egregious 
failure of care, and pointing out that standards of care may not be fiduciary). 
 42. Gold, supra note 28, at 459 (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)).  
 43. Id. at 470–71.  
 44. Id. at 459, 470–74. 
 45. 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009). 
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It influences the norms that apply to guide director behavior and shape 
shareholders’ and directors’ expectations about how directors ought to 
behave.46  Still, without liability, or even a credible threat of liability, it is 
hard to say that these norms have become part of the enforceable duty. 
Although the court’s recharacterization of bad faith as a breach of 
the duty of loyalty may seem like a significant step in the direction of ex-
panding the duty of loyalty, the change can be characterized as mostly 
rhetorical.  Breaches of the duty to act in good faith have always been 
punishable with monetary liability,47 so the remedy has not changed.  In 
practice, the fact that the Delaware courts now call a failure to act in 
good faith a breach of the duty of loyalty makes no difference.  While the 
bad faith standard is now better understood, it requires only a low stand-
ard of conduct and it is still only rarely enforced with liability.48 
2. The Duty of Care 
Unfortunately for litigious shareholders and their attorneys, the 
corporate duty of care is even more limited.  A common understanding 
of “fiduciary” seems to imply that a fiduciary must exercise extreme 
care—perhaps as much care as he would exercise if he were performing 
the task for himself.49  The business judgment rule, a presumption that 
directors have made an informed decision that they rationally believe to 
be in the best interests of the corporation, bars courts from reviewing the 
merits of a business decision.  A poor business decision, without more, is 
not a breach of fiduciary duty, though it may prove more harmful to 
shareholder interests than a breach of the duty of loyalty.  When some-
thing goes awry with a corporation, shareholders and their attorneys as-
sume some breach of fiduciary duty must have occurred and look for po-
tential causes of action. 
Courts have been fairly realistic about what part-time directors can 
discover in their monitoring of the firm,50 requiring only that information 
and reporting systems be in place that would alert management to a 
problem should one arise, and that managers pay attention to those sys-
                                                                                                                                      
 46. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and 
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1640–45 (2001). 
 47. The Delaware legislature has allowed corporations to exculpate directors from monetary 
liability for breaches of the duty of care, but not for breaches of the duty of loyalty of failures to act in 
good faith.  DEL. CODE. ANN.  tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (West 2013). 
 48. Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 243–44. 
 49. Indeed, trust law’s “prudent man rule” requires that a trustee manage the assets of a trust as 
a prudent man would manage his own affairs.  Rock Springs Land and Timber, Inc. v. Lore, 75 P.3d 
614, 621‒22 (Wyo. 2003) (holding a trustee acted in a reasonable and prudent manner by selling trust 
property); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804 (2000) (“A trustee shall administer the trust as a prudent person 
would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other circumstances of the 
trust.”).  
 50. In a 2006 survey, directors, on average, reported spending seventeen hours per month on 
their board duties. KORN/FERRY INT’L, 33RD ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY: CELEBRATING 
MORE THAN THREE DECADES OF GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS 23 (2006). 
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tems and respond to red flags. 51  Because of a strong business judgment 
rule,52 liability for the duty of care will not attach for poor decision-
making absent some significant failure of process. 
If one interprets fiduciary duty to mean that the fiduciary must do 
an extremely careful, competent, and completely selfless job guarding 
the interests of others, fiduciary obligation is painted far too broadly, and 
certainly more broadly than it is actually enforced in the corporate con-
text.  Understanding fiduciary obligation this way gives the beneficiary a 
false sense of security, a belief that they are far more protected than they 
actually are.  If shareholders are able to understand the duty more realis-
tically (more narrowly) they may insist upon other protections for indif-
ferent or incompetent performance by directors, or they may demand 
ways to hold other corporate actors, such as officers, accountable. 
The narrower understanding of corporate fiduciary obligation also 
protects directors from a risk of overwhelming, catastrophic liability.  If 
directors were not assured that they would not be bankrupted for unsuc-
cessful business ventures taken by the firms they manage, they would not 
take positions on boards (or in C-suites, for that matter) and that would 
hurt corporations and shareholders alike.53  It is one thing to require a 
faithless director to give back gains she took at the expense of the corpo-
ration she was supposed to selflessly manage, but quite another to ask a 
director to come up with millions and millions of dollars to cover losses 
the corporation realized because of a violation of law or business failure.  
Disgorgement, the remedy for a breach of the duty of loyalty, is not as 
frequently catastrophic as compensatory damages, the remedy for other 
injuries.  Corporate directors would agree to owe fiduciary duties, under-
standing that they constitute an obligation to refrain from indulging self-
interest in managing assets, and that ill-gotten gains will be disgorged.  
Directors likely would not agree to “fiduciary” obligation, an obligation 
to be selfless, beyond that. 
The corporate duty of care falls well short of what one would con-
sider a heightened “fiduciary” standard.  Even if it were more rigorous, it 
would not be frequently enforced as directors are largely exculpated 
from personal, monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care.  The 
corporate standard of care gives plaintiff shareholders little comfort.  It 
also removes corporate directors from the aspirational view of fiduciary 
obligation where the fiduciary zealously pursues the best interest of an-
                                                                                                                                      
 51. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996)  (ap-
proving a settlement agreement for violation of federal insurance law that imposed no personal liabil-
ity for directors when the directors did not intentionally disobey the law and had no specific reason to 
believe that their monitoring program was inadequate to prevent illegality).  
 52. The business judgment rule is a “presumption that in making a business decision the direc-
tors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.”  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 53. E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in a Post Enron/Worldcom Environ-
ment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 731, 734 (2003) (“There must . . . be a balancing of director accountability 
with the need to encourage qualified, conscientious and honest people to serve as corporate direc-
tors.”). 
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other.  Shareholders are not powerless, however.  They have other tools 
at their disposal and the market has designed other mechanisms to con-
strain the agency costs in corporate governance. 
3. Alternative Governance Mechanisms 
Corporate officers and directors are subject to a number of govern-
ance devices designed to limit agency costs.  For instance, the market for 
corporate control provides a mechanism to replace managers who are 
performing poorly.54  In the same vein, corporate directors are concerned 
about their reputations in the corporate executive community.  Most di-
rectors are CEOs of other firms.  Poor performance in a CEO position or 
directorship can reduce the likelihood an executive will receive similar 
opportunities in the future.  Shareholders can use their voting rights to 
change the board of directors and approve or disapprove of potential 
conflicts of interests those board members might have.  Also, creditors 
play an important role in monitoring the managers of firms with debt.  
Shareholders often free-ride on the monitoring creditors can do, relying 
on those creditors to exercise more control over the firm and alert the 
market when the firm is in financial trouble by declaring a default or tak-
ing some other action to try to remove or replace underperforming man-
agers.55  Ribstein insisted that fiduciary duties were only appropriate 
where other mechanisms for managing the fiduciary relationship were 
not available.  It would appear that corporate governance has developed 
mechanisms to constrain agency costs that are more effective than the 
enforcement of weak corporate fiduciary duties. 
Incentive compensation provides a key example.  Corporations 
have increasingly relied on incentive compensation to align managers’ 
interests with those of shareholders. 56  Incentive compensation for corpo-
rate managers, and, to a lesser degree, even corporate directors, poses an 
interesting question for corporate fiduciary obligation.  The purpose of 
incentive compensation is to give managers a stake in the corporation’s 
financial success.  Managers, then, are encouraged to consider self-
interest in deciding what course of action the corporation should take.  It 
is hard to see how someone can have an obligation to be completely self-
                                                                                                                                      
 54. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–
13 (1965) (explaining that if a companyʼs stock price decreases due to inefficient management, another 
entity may take it over and operate it more efficiently). 
 55. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1212 (2006) (“Loan covenants now are the principal mechanism 
for handling one of the most challenging problems in corporate governance, the one that arises when a 
once-effective manager needs replacing and the operations of the business must go through a funda-
mental overhaul.”); Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 68, 70 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell 
eds., 2012) (arguing that since loan covenants usually require companies to make payments, managers 
are motivated to maximize profitability to avoid bankruptcy or a lower stock price).  
 56. This is particularly true since Congress amended the Tax Code to only allow corporations to 
take deductions for salaries under $1 million.  Any compensation over that amount must be tied to 
performance in order to be deductible.  I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012); Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Execu-
tive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 879 (2007). 
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less when so much of their compensation arrangement depends on oper-
ating the firm with a strong consideration of personal financial interest.  
It is impossible to have it both ways. 
The use of incentive compensation should remove corporate man-
agement from Ribstein’s fiduciary realm, because the managers would 
have “corresponding economic rights”57 and an incentive to consider, not 
renounce, thought of self.  Incentive compensation may be a great alter-
native to “complete selflessness,” but it cannot be part of a regime of 
complete selflessness.  Indeed, scholars have expressed concern that 
managers have allowed their interest in incentive compensation to domi-
nate their judgment about what the best course of action is for a corpora-
tion’s long-term health.58  On the other hand, if we limit our understand-
ing of the duty of loyalty to “don’t be . . . conflicted without permis-
permission,”59 then fiduciary obligation and incentive compensation can 
sit side by side. 
B. Uncorporations 
Unincorporated firms, which Ribstein dubbed “uncorporations,” 
have developed to respond to some of the perceived weaknesses of cor-
porate governance.60  Different entrepreneurs may have different needs 
when it comes to organizing the governance of their business, and so may 
choose different business forms.  A number of distinct business forms are 
in regular use now, from the general partnership to the public corpora-
tion, with many hybrids of the two poles in between.  These business 
forms also offer alternatives to fiduciary obligation. 
While partners are widely understood by scholars and courts to owe 
each other fiduciary duties, even the Uniform Partnership Act says so,61 
Ribstein fervently and convincingly argued that partners are not fiduciar-
ies based on the application of his fiduciary theory.62  Partners, he argued, 
are owners; owners may not be allowed to misappropriate partnership 
property, but they are not obliged to renounce all thought of self.63   
Ribstein was able to show, from a theoretical perspective, every sup-
posed “breach” of partnership fiduciary duties can be recast as some 
                                                                                                                                      
 57. Ribstein, Fencing, supra note 1, at 901. 
 58. Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk 
Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1206–07 (2011) (explaining that equity based incentive pay en-
courages risky behavior because managers profit when a risky investment succeeds but creditors bear 
the losses when the investment fails); David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term 
Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 435–36 (2010). 
 59. Alces, Debunking, supra note 41.  
 60. RIBSTEIN, supra note 1 
 61. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(a) (1997) (“The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partner-
ship and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care . . . .”).  
 62. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries, supra note 1, at 237–38 (“Although partners generally 
have significant governance powers . . . they do not have fiduciary-like open-ended management pow-
er to manage the firm on behalf of passive members.  Only managing partners in partnerships with 
centralized management and partners who act as agents should be deemed to have fiduciary duties.”). 
 63. Id. at 241–42. 
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other tort or breach of nonfiduciary duty.  Thus, he argues, partners are 
not fiduciaries and not bound to be selfless in their use or control of 
partnership property.64  As both the owners and managers themselves, 
they cannot be owners who have delegated control over their property to 
someone else.65  Thus, they do not fit within Ribstein’s paradigmatic case 
for fiduciary relationships. 
Other scholars, Ribstein, courts, and the UPA all agree that part-
ners are free to modify by contract the fiduciary duties owed to each oth-
er.66  The UPA is a set of default rules, so partners are free to form what-
ever agreement suits them and may contract around the vast majority of 
the UPA provisions.  While the UPA does not explicitly allow partners 
to waive their fiduciary duties entirely, and it is unclear whether courts 
would uphold such waivers if they were attempted, partners can do a lot 
to define the limits of their fiduciary obligation including excepting cer-
tain circumstances from fiduciary obligation.  This flexibility of form is a 
defining feature of uncorporations. 
Most striking are the recent developments in Delaware LLCs that 
may allow parties to opt out of fiduciary duties entirely.67  LLCs can be 
managed by their owners, or members, hired professional managers.68 
Members may owe fiduciary duties to each other in member-managed 
firms, and managers may owe fiduciary duties to the members in manag-
er-managed firms.69  While it is taking some time for most courts to adjust 
to the complete waivability of fiduciary duties in business associations,70 
Delaware courts have led the way in making clear that fiduciary duties 
are not mandatory in LLCs.71  Many parties have chosen to waive fiduci-
                                                                                                                                      
 64. Id. at 241–44. 
 65. Id. at 237–38. 
 66. See, e.g., Wilson v. Button, 404 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding a partner could with-
draw funds from the partnership while the partnership was insolvent because the partnership agree-
ment allowed him a salary); Murphy v. Gutfreund, 583 F. Supp. 957, 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding a 
partner did not breach his fiduciary duty by taking a substantial profit at the time of dissolution be-
cause he did not violate the partnership agreement); Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766, 772 (Okla. App. 
1981) (“We find the defendants had a contract right to do precisely what they did, namely, compete 
with the partners of Josaline and with Josaline itself ʻas if there  never had been a partnership.ʼ”); 
UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103 (1997) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), relations among the 
partners and between the partners and the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement. . . .  
The partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the 
duty of loyalty . . . . ”); RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 172‒77 (discussing ways that partnership law allows 
contractual alteration of fiduciary duties in specific types of partnerships); Easterbrook & Fischel, su-
pra note 19, at 432‒33 (“The duty of loyalty is commonly relaxed because partners often do not com-
mit full time to venture. . . .  The duty of care is the negligence rule.  All rules are freely variable by 
contract . . . . ”); Frankel, Default Rules, supra note 26, at 1237‒38 (discussing that in certain circum-
stances, parties can bargain to change fiduciary duties).  
 67. RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 177 (“[T]he Delaware LLC statute includes the same provision for 
wide-open opt-out as the Delaware limited partnership statute.”). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 177–78. 
 71. Id. (“Indeed, one of the strongest applications of Delwareʼs freedom of contract approach is 
in the LLC case of R & R Capital, LLC v. Buck & Doe Run Valley Farms, LLC, in which the court 
enforced an operating agreement provision waiving the right to bring an action for judicial dissolu-
tion.”). 
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ary duties entirely, or to limit or carefully define them.72  The fact that 
parties are willingly and knowingly choosing to eschew fiduciary obliga-
tion shows that fiduciary duties are not necessary to protect business 
owners and that other mechanisms may be just as effective, if not more 
effective, especially when owners are more attentive to management.73 
Fiduciary duty in business association law is dying a slow death, but 
that does not mean directors or other managers are a heartbeat away 
from being able to use the assets of the businesses they manage as their 
own without regard to others.  We are not in danger of returning to the 
days of Ross Johnson and RJR Nabisco, far from it.74  Other mechanisms 
have grown to make up for the atrophy of fiduciary obligation, giving 
shareholders and other owners more reliable, less costly ways to disci-
pline managers.  Ribstein would argue that where other mechanisms are 
as or more effective, fiduciary obligation is not appropriate.  Even if one 
thinks that the presence of other disciplining tools is not enough to justify 
removing a relationship from the fiduciary realm, it is clear that courts, 
business owners and managers, and state legislatures are becoming less 
comfortable with the use of fiduciary duties to mediate the relationships 
in business associations. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The decline of fiduciary obligation in business associations does not 
mean that fiduciary relationships themselves are on the decline, however.  
There are still a host of situations in which parties may strongly prefer 
the use of fiduciary duties, relationships that are firmly at the “fiduciary” 
end of the Easterbrook/Fischel continuum ,75 where the entrustor really is 
unsophisticated and vulnerable to the power and judgment of the fiduci-
ary.76  While Ribstein would disagree that many of these relationships 
should be fiduciary, we can use his argument that fiduciary obligation 
should be narrowly and predictably applied to explain how to make the 
use of fiduciary obligation in these relationships most effective. 
If parties can choose contractually whether or not to enter into a fi-
duciary relationship, then they may choose to use fiduciary duties even in 
situations Ribstein finds inappropriate for fiduciary relationships.  Re-
spect for market forces and rational decision-making should support the 
use of fiduciary obligation by willing parties.  Indeed, there are situations 
more delicate than the management of property in which beneficiaries 
may want to fill the gaps with a promise from the other party to abstain 
                                                                                                                                      
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. RJR Nabiscoʼs CEO, Ross Johnson, was notorious for using corporate funds for executive 
perks.  During his tenure, RJR Nabisco paid for corporate executives to golf with celebrities and main-
tained an “air force” of private jets to carry executives to personal vacations. BRYAN BURROUGH & 
JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO 91–96 (1990). 
 75. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 19, at 438 (arguing that contractual relationships are only 
fiduciary where it is prohibitively expensive to negotiate the necessary terms). 
 76. Frankel, supra note 20, at 808. 
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from undisclosed conflicts of interest in the performance of a given task.  
Not only do private parties recognize the large gaps in monitoring and 
relative vulnerability in certain relationships, but the law has become ac-
customed to enforcing fiduciary obligation in those relationships. 
For example, the attorney-client relationship is often described as 
one that is traditionally fiduciary.77  The law is accustomed to requiring 
that attorneys zealously pursue their clients’ interests and that they not 
indulge interests that may conflict with those of a particular client with-
out first disclosing the potential conflict to the client and receiving the 
client’s approval.  There are some conflicts that cannot be overcome by 
the client’s permission where the conflicted attorney would have to avoid 
the conflict entirely or quit the representation of the client.  Law firms 
vigorously monitor potential conflicts between attorneys and clients.  
The rules of professional responsibility go to great lengths to define the 
appropriate standard of conduct for attorneys and describe what consti-
tutes a conflict and how an attorney, law firm, and client should handle it.  
These strictly enforced standards of conduct cover every facet of the at-
torney-client relationship and leave very little to chance in a court’s ex 
post determination of whether an attorney has breached her fiduciary du-
ties.  While fiduciary duties may apply to the relationship and zealous 
advocacy is clearly required, the obligation an attorney owes a client is 
not left to vague, unpredictable ex post judicial review.  It is quite thor-
oughly described in codes of conduct that have grown ever more com-
plete and sophisticated over time. 
While not all fiduciary relationships are governed by codified stand-
ards of conduct, they tend to have a rich body of law supporting their use 
and rendering them easier to administer.  Fiduciary duties may be able to 
respond to unanticipated situations, but they are not unpredictably ap-
plied.  This judicial gap filling helps fiduciaries to understand their obli-
gations and makes them more comfortable entering into a fiduciary rela-
tionship in the first place.  The better fiduciaries understand their 
obligations, the less likely they are to run afoul of them.  The clarification 
of what fiduciary obligation means in particular circumstances helps to 
simplify the duty and makes it easier to enforce. 
This effective simplification is in line with Ribstein’s view of fiduci-
ary duties as a relatively narrow contract term.  While Ribstein calls the 
remedy of fiduciary obligation “strong medicine,” he describes the duty 
of loyalty in narrow terms related to avoiding conflicts of interest relating 
to the specific fiduciary task.  If fiduciary obligation is a narrow, 
“fenced,” contract term, then it can be added to a variety of contracts 
and easily and relatively predictably enforced. 
                                                                                                                                      
 77. DeMott, supra note 33, at 912; D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary 
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The theory advanced in this Article turns Ribstein’s theory on its 
head, then—it advocates narrowly understood fiduciary duties in a wide 
variety of situations where Ribstein argued that a broad, extreme theory 
of loyalty be used only sparingly.  This new theory avoids the indetermi-
nacy involved if one casts fiduciary obligation as a means to cause 
strangers to treat each other as something else.  It is best if strangers re-
main on guard when dealing with strangers, even if the fiduciary stranger 
agrees to be bound by a term whereby he has to eschew self-interest with 
regard to a particular transaction or task.  We will never know what lies 
in a fiduciary’s heart and we can only enforce what we can see.  We limit 
the enforcement of the duty of loyalty to disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, 
and do not provide a remedy for all of the ways a fiduciary could be dis-
appointing or lazy or a “bad guy.”  The market for fiduciary services and 
reputation and other such mechanisms must step in to perform those 
tasks.  This understanding of the limited role of fiduciary obligation is al-
so consistent with Ribstein’s position on trust.  We cannot legally force 
people to be “good” to one another.  We cannot force them even to be 
completely faithful.  We can only be sure that they do not profit from 
conflicted interests when they agree not to. 
Future research should take the lessons Ribstein’s work has given 
us and look for the proper role, and definition, of fiduciary obligation in 
a variety of contexts.  His caution about “fencing” the scope and nature 
of fiduciary obligation can help us use it and apply it better in instances 
where parties agree that it is a term to which they want to be bound.  
Combining a well-established knowledge of the instances in which par-
ties find fiduciary obligation most helpful may lead us to the path toward 
the most effective use of fiduciary relationships in the future. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Larry Ribstein encouraged scholars and courts to “fence” fiduciary 
duties.  That is, to understand that there is only one truly fiduciary duty, 
the duty of loyalty, and that duty commands selflessness, defined by an 
avoidance of conflicts, only in particular situations.  He argued that fidu-
ciary duties are only appropriate where an owner of property delegates 
open-ended control over that property to another.  His narrow view of 
fiduciary obligation is well supported in the use and enforcement of fidu-
ciary obligation in business associations.  Fiduciary obligation in business 
association governance is growing increasingly obsolete as other mecha-
nisms rise up to take its place. 
Other scholars have encouraged us to have a broader understanding 
of fiduciary obligation and to apply it in a variety of settings where one 
party allows herself to be vulnerable to the power or judgment of anoth-
er.  We can take important lessons from both views.  Ribstein’s view of 
fiduciary duty as a contract term that should be applied carefully allows 
us to see it as a term that can be freely added to any number of relation-
ships and it is most useful when it is best understood.  A narrow, relative-
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ly specific understanding o f the duty of loyalty would help to best strike 
this balance so that parties fully comprehend the consequences and re-
quirements of the term they are adopting.  A narrow understanding of 
what fiduciary duties are, then, allows parties to import them into a vari-
ety of situations in which one party may be vulnerable to the judgment of 
another. 
 
